Abdul Razzaq Anjum

Air Vice Marshal
Abdul Razzaq Anjum
TI(M) SI(M) Sbt
Air Vice Marshal Abdul Razzaq Anjum TI(M) SI(M) Sbt
عبدالرزاق انجم
	Fl Cdt Abdul Razzaq being presented with the; Sword of Honour by Aziz Ahmed for being the top graduate of the 55 GD(P) course (PAF Academy)
Deputy Chief of the Air Staff; (Training & Evaluation)
	In office; 30 November 2000 – 20 February 2003
Commander PAF Base Masroor
	In office; July 1998 – March 2000
Officer Commanding; Combat Commanders' School
	In office; August 1992 – March 1994
Officer Commanding; No. 14 Squadron PAF
	In office; July 1988 – February 1989
Preceded by	Abdus Sami Toor
Succeeded by	S. Muzaffar Ali
Officer Commanding; No. 9 Squadron PAF
	In office; October 1985 – July 1988
Personal details
Born	Mian Abdul Razzaq Anjum; 25 November 1952; Wan Bhachran, Pakistan
Died	20 February 2003 (aged 50); Kohat Pass, Pakistan
Resting place	Graveyard Pakka Ghanjera
Children	4
Education	PAF College Sargodha (FSc); PAF College Lower Topa; PAF Academy; Combat Commanders' School; PAF Staff College; National Defence College, Rawalpindi
Civilian awards	Set a new record by getting the highest marks in both Science and Humanities Groups from the Sargodha board. He scored 884 marks and won a Gold Medal from the Board (1970)
Military service
Branch/service	Pakistan Air Force
Years of service	1973-2003
Rank	Air Vice Marshal
Commands	PAF Base Masroor; Combat Commanders' School; No. 14 Squadron PAF; No. 9 Squadron PAF
Battles/wars	Indo-Pakistani War of 1971; Soviet–Afghan War; 2001–2002 India–Pakistan standoff
Military awards	Sword of Honour (1973); Trophy for Best Performance in Ground Subjects (1973); Sitara-i-Imtiaz; Tamgha-e-Imtiaz; Sitara-e-Basalat

Air Vice Marshal Abdul Razzaq Anjum SI(M) TI(M) Sbt (Urdu: عبدالرزاق انجم; 25 November 1952 — 20 February 2003) was a two-star rank officer of the Pakistan Air Force who held the position of Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (Training & Evaluation). He died in an air crash, along with CAS of the PAF Mushaf Ali Mir, his wife Begum Bilquis Mir, Air Vice Marshal Saleem Akhtar Nawaz, Rizwan Ullah Khan, and 13 other senior air force officials and aircrew. Had he lived, he would have been considered for the position of Chief of Air Staff.

Abdul Razzaq was known for setting a new record by getting the highest marks in the Intermediate exams and in the Science/Humanities Groups from the Sargodha board. He scored 884 marks and won a Gold Medal from the Board in 1970 with this record remaining unbroken for 27 years.^[1]^[2]^[3]

Prior to his death, he dedicated his efforts to creating a Cadet College in Mianwali in collaboration with Imran Khan. He wanted to reside there after retirement and contribute to his district's improvement.^[4]

One year after his death, the Junior Model School was renamed to Abdul Razzaq Fazaia College during the tenure of Air Commodore Inamullah Khan who was then Base Commander of PAF Base Mianwali.^[5]

Early life

Mian Abdul Razzaq Anjum was born on 25 November 1952 in Wan Bhachran to Mian Mohammad Hayat, a school teacher. He has two brothers Mian Amir Hayat a former Colonel in the Pakistan Army and Mian Muhammad Nawaz Salar.^[6]

He received his education at a local school and later enrolled in PAF Cadet College Sargodha as part of the 16th Entry from Class 8 to 12, his Student No. was 795 and he resided in the Sabre House. He received scholarships in Class 5 and 8 and excelled by securing the first position in Matriculation examination. In class 12, he secured the top position in the Sargodha boards Intermediate/FSc exams, setting a new record for the Board with 884/1000 marks in the results announced on 12 September 1970—a record he held which remained unbroken for 27 years until 1997.^[6]

Despite receiving scholarship offers from the American and British embassies to study in their countries, he declined and chose to join the Pakistan Air Force.^[6]^[7]

Personal life

Abdul Razzaq was married and the father of four children, two sons and two daughters.^[8] The ARFiC in its January 2019 issue, described Abdul Razzaq as a "very humble, simple, hardworking, brave, ambitious, industrious person and a real son of the soil," who was obedient to his parents and teachers. Additionally, he was an excellent soccer player during his student life at Cadet College and he contemplated joining the Pakistan men's national field hockey team but his instructors didn't allow him and forced him to go to the Air Force.^[6]

Air Force career

Abdul Razzaq's achievement highlighted in the 1970 PAF Cadet College Sargodha journal

Abdul Razzaq was commissioned in the Pakistan Air Force on 21 April 1973 from the 55th GD(P) course at the PAF Academy. He was the top graduate for which he received the coveted Sword of Honour and the Trophy for Best Performance in Ground Subjects.^[1]

He graduated from the Combat Commanders' School, PAF Staff College, and National Defence College, Rawalpindi.^[1]

In October 1985, he was appointed the Officer Commanding No. 9 Squadron PAF. From July 1988 to February 1989, Wg Cdr Abdul Razzaq served as Officer Commanding No. 14 Squadron PAF. As Group Captain, he served as Officer Commanding Combat Commanders' School from August 1992 to March 1994.^[2]

Later, he served as Director Operations and Air Staff Officer in the Pakistan Air Force's Southern Air Command. Air Commodore Abdul Razzaq was appointed Base Commander PAF Base Masroor. Afterwards, he served as Personal Staff Officer to CAS of the PAF PQ Mehdi. On 30 November 2000, he was promoted to Air Vice Marshal and appointed as Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (Training & Evaluation).^[1]

Joint USAF/PAF Air Exercise 1978

In April 1978, the USAF and PAF held a joint exercise at PAF Base Masroor where two PAF Mirages went up against the two Americans in their F-15's. Air Commodore Jamal Hussain was the leader and Flight Lieutenant Abdul Razzaq, as the No 2 played a pivotal role. Facing the formidable F-15s, an unconventional vertical split maneuver was executed, catching the F-15s off guard. Abdul Razzaq's keen situational awareness allowed him to engage an F-15 successfully, while Jamal pursued another.

Jamal after landing met Abdul Razzaq on the tarmac, recalling that Abdul Razzaq wore a grin that "would have made the Cheshire Cat proud." "What?" Jamal asked, to which Abdul Razzaq responded, "You should see the gunshot I have exposed on the F-15," he burst out. Jamal replied with "Let's check it out" and assessed each other's camera film.

Jamal mentions that both his assertions and Abdul Razzaq's were accurate, but there was a catch. According to the ROE, the minimum safe distance during a gunshot scenario was set at 600 feet. In Abdul Razzaq's video footage, Abdul Razzaq's Mirage's gun sight was the same size as the F-15's canopy - he had approached to less than 100 feet of the F-15 and despite this his sight was "sitting pretty" and maintained a steady aim.

Jamal, astonished said, "Oh my God! Hide it. If the bosses see it, both of us would get grounded, if not worse." Abdul Razzaq added, “But don’t you agree it is a beautiful sight,” Jamal replied “I am impressed,” adding that "I just could not help marvel at the enthusiasm and ego of my irrepressible no 2."^[9]

They assessed the films, confirming both claims were valid. Despite the risk, Abdul Razzaq's daring maneuver earned them two kills in that exercise along with the USAF pilots earning the same. After Jamal and Abdul Razzaq complimented the F-15 pair on their professionalism, the F-15 leader of the USAF, dumbfounded, acknowledged the skill displayed by the two PAF pilots applauding their subterfuge and aggressive handling.^[9]

Defending Pakistani airspace during the Soviet-Afghan War

On 30 March 1987, OC No. 9 Squadron PAF Wing Commander Abdul Razzaq, initiated a mission from PAF Base Sargodha aboard his F-16A alongside his No. 2 Wingman Sqn Ldr Sikandar Hayat and Ground Controller Sqn Ldr Pervaiz Ali Khan. The duo launched AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles at an Antonov An-26 military aircraft that had violated Pakistani airspace, engaged in reconnaissance. They targeted the intruder and the aircraft crashed near Miranshah. On 1 April 1987, a Foreign Office spokesman reiterated that the Afghan plane was a military plane and not a transport aircraft as alleged by the Afghan regime who contended that it was a civilian transport plane carrying 40 passengers, including two children, en route to Khost. In a declassified CIA document, it was revealed that it was indeed a military aircraft and not a civilian aircraft as claimed by the Afghan Regime.^[10]^[11]^[12]^[13]

Abdul Razzaq detailed the event in his incident report to the Pakistan Air Force:^[2]

DETAIL
WING COMMANDER ABDUL RAZZAQ (PAK/5837)
The vector given by the controllers started the flow of adrenaline. All the preparatory actions were over in less than 30 seconds. The bandits (two of them) were reported close to Parachinar; another 30-40 miles had to be covered. Soon the controller reported that now only one bandit was violating the border. The second had turned away. When I brought the target into the TD [Target Designator] box at 3-4 NM [nautical miles], I realized that it was a slow moving, larger aircraft. I asked for permission to shoot, which was quickly given. With an overtake rate of well over 200 knots and a low IR [Infra-Red] signature; the minimum range cue was lying close to 4,000 feet. Effectively, I had no more than 1.5 second firing window available. Everything worked as conceived and with the press of the button, the missile was on its way. As I was breaking off, I saw the missile impact the target. No. 2 also released his missile, which also impacted the target. The enemy aircraft crashed on the snow-clad mountains below.

Death in air crash

On 20 February 2003, Abdul Razzaq and Air Chief Marshal Mushaf Ali Mir boarded a Fokker F-27 aircraft operated by the Pakistan Air Force, along with his wife Bilquis Mir and other high-ranking officials of the Pakistan Air Force, including two other Principal Staff Officers – Air Vice Marshal Saleem Nawaz, DCAS (Administration) – and Air Commodore Rizwan Ullah Khan, from Chaklala airbase for a routine flight to Northern Air Command PAF Base Kohat in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for the annual inspection of the base and to review annual preparations and readiness.

The plane lost contact from military radars at the Northern Air Command and crashed after hitting the highest peak of the mountain at the Tolanj mountain range in Kohat District due to extreme fog and winter temperature.^[14]^[15]^[16] Among the casualties were other high-ranking officials of the Pakistan Air Force, including Personal Staff Officer Air Commodore Rizwan Ullah Khan and two Principal Staff Officers – Air Vice Marshal's Abdul Razzaq and Saleem Akhtar Nawaz, DCAS (Administration) – and the air crew.^[17]

The Government of Pakistan gave them a state funeral which was attended by 75,000+ people along with foreign dignitaries. Citizens lined the streets from Chaklala to Islamabad and as their coffins passed, many were crying openly. Mushaf Ali Mir and his wife, Bilqees Mir, were buried in Lahore. The remains of Air Vice Marshal Abdul Razzaq were taken to Mianwali; Air Commodore Rizwan Ullah Khan and AVM Saleem Akhter Nawaz were buried next to each other in Islamabad; Group Captain Aftab Cheema to Sargodha; Corporal Technician Amjad to Jhelum; Squadron Leader Abdul Rab to Kohat; Squadron Leader Mumtaz Kiani to Abbottabad; Senior Technician Khan Mohammad to Chontra; Senior Technician Ashraf to Chakwal; Senior Technician Ghazanfar to Gujrat; Technician Fayyaz to Swabi; and Technician Khush Qaddam Shah to Gilgit.^[18]^[19]

Following the crash, the Pakistan Air Force Flight Safety and CAA ruled out the "act of sabotage" and termed the incident as an accident.^[15]

Further military insights revealed in the 2015 parliamentary committee noted that the aircraft was faulty, and was first identified as such by the Pakistan Navy inspection team as early as 1993.^[20] The Pakistan Navy purchased the aircraft for reconnaissance missions before it was transferred to Pakistan Army Aviation Corps in 1993, who then transferred the plane to the Pakistan Air Force in 1994, which never reviewed the inspection protocol to assess the performance of the aircraft.^[20]

Over 10,000 people attended his funeral at PAF Base Mianwali and he was buried in his hometown Wan Bhachran at Graveyard Pakka Ghanjera.^[8]^[21]

Awards & decorations

PAF GD(P) Badge RED (More than 3000 Flying Hours)
Sword of Honour PAF Academy 1973
Golden Eagle Award (Exceptional Fighter Pilot)
Sitara-i-Imtiaz (Military) (Star of Excellence)			Sitara-e-Basalat (Star of Valour)
Tamgha-i-Imtiaz (Military) (Medal of Excellence)	Sitara-e-Harb 1971 War (War Star 1971)	Tamgha-e-Istaqlal Pakistan (Escalation with India Medal) 2002	Tamgha-e-Baqa (Nuclear Test Medal) 1998
10 Years Service Medal	20 Years Service Medal	30 Years Service Medal	Tamgha-e-Sad Saala Jashan-e-Wiladat-e-Quaid-e-Azam (100th Birth Anniversary of Muhammad Ali Jinnah) 1976
Hijri Tamgha (Hijri Medal) 1979	Jamhuriat Tamgha (Democracy Medal) 1988	Qarardad-e-Pakistan Tamgha (Resolution Day) (Golden Jubilee Medal) 1990	Tamgha-e-Salgirah Pakistan (Independence Day Golden Jubilee Medal) 1997

Notes

^ This record remained unbroken for 27 years

References

^ ^a ^b ^c ^d "An Airman Remembered". Defence Journal. 1 March 2003. Archived from the original on 28 August 2016. Retrieved 22 January 2024.
^ ^a ^b ^c Rashid Shaikh, A. (2000). The Story of the Pakistan Air Force, 1988-1998. Shaheen Foundation. pp. 372, 373. ISBN 978-969-8553-00-5.
^ "Pakistan's Successful Encounters During the Afghan War". Global Defense Insight. 13 December 2021.
^ "The cadet college issue". www.dawn.com. 17 May 2005. Mianwali district, the abode of valiant and talented people, remained deprived of such quality educational institutions. In fact, the entire southern and central Punjab did not have any institution like a cadet college, except PAF College, Sargodha. Perhaps it was because of this sense of deprivation that notable sons of the soil like AVM Shaheed Abdul Razzaq and MNA Imran Khan had been trying for the establishment of a cadet college in Mianwali. Their dreams seemed to be coming true when Governor Khalid Maqbool announced the establishment of a cadet college in Mianwali while speaking at a public gathering on Jan 24, 2002. The announcement was followed by directives for the preparation of a feasibility report of this project.
^ "Fazaia | Schools & Colleges". fazaia.edu.pk.
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d Abdul Razzaq Fazaia College - ARFiC NEWS
^ "In connection with Air Force Day". Daily Soon Times. 2022.
^ ^a ^b "AVM Razzaq laid to rest". www.dawn.com. 22 February 2003.
^ ^a ^b Hussain, Jamal (2005). "A page in PAF history". tribune.com.pk. Early this year, USAF had conducted a joint air exercise with the Indian Air Force, codenamed 'Cope India'. A brief report of the event appeared in the Dawn article of Friday June 15 titled, "Air exercise with India a wake-up call for US: general". The article brought back fond memories of similar exercises that PAF used to hold with USAF on a regular basis in the sixty and seventy decades of the previous century. I was fortunate to attend two very comprehensive joint USAF/PAF exercises in April and November/December 1978 codenamed Shabaz78 and Midlink 78 respectively. I consider it a privilege to be able to share my experiences of the two events with the public in general and my successors, the current generation of PAF fighter pilots. If you want a peep into the dream and wonderful world of fighter pilots where passion, vocation and profession are rolled into a single homogenous mix, then read on. Welcome to our little world with our idiosyncrasies and jargons that only we relish and are familiar with. Shahbaz 78, a joint USAF/PAF Exercise was held at PAF Base Masroor in April 1978. A detachment of Mirage Squadron from Sargodha Base was deployed at Masroor for the purpose. The first part of the exercise was fairly straight forward where USAF aircraft conducted night raids at Masroor Base and PAF interceptors flew air defence missions against them. Both the USAF strike elements and PAF's air defence fighters operated from Masroor. The second half of the exercise was a planned Dissimilar Air Combat Training Camp (DACT) that pitted the formidable F-15s, USAF's prize new acquisition against PAF's Mirages and F6s. For much of the 60s and part of the 70s of the twentieth century, USAF F-4s were considered the top of the line combat aircraft, especially in the air superiority role. Following their not so encouraging performance in air combat in the Vietnam War (kill ratio of 4:1 in favour of USAF as against 10:1 in the Korean Conflict), USAF was looking for an unadulterated air superiority fighter to replace the multi-role and aging F-4 fleet. The F-15 entered service around 1975 and in every parameter of combat manoeuvring, it outperformed its contemporaries by a wide margin. It was developed for one single role – establish air superiority by decimating the adversary's combat aircraft in air combat. The F-15 combat Wings that were raised were not assigned multi-roles; they concentrated solely on air to air combat training and nothing else. One such Wing was deployed at Bittburg in Germany. Besides conducting mutual air combat missions, they frequently flew against Saab-Drakens, Lightnings, Phantoms, Mirages and F-104s belonging to the air forces of their European NATO allies. The stories of how they have been chewing up their adversaries with consummate ease had preceded their arrival. The Wing was deployed at PAF Base Masroor in April 78 to participate in a DACT Camp. I had the privilege of being a member of the Mirage flight deployed at Masroor for the purpose. The F-6 Squadron that participated in the Exercise was commanded by the irrepressible Wing Commander Safdar Mahmood (retired as Air Commodore), better known to his comrades as Safdar Mousey, for reasons I never knew then and still do not know till today. The gleaming F-15s parked at Masroor tarmac were a sight to behold. Here was the most lethal fighter of its time and we by comparison in our antiquated Mirages and F-6s were going to take them head on, both in the literal and metaphorical sense. How should we plan to achieve this apparently improbable feat? Vanity is an essential ingredient of fighter pilots and they are generally hopeless optimists with a never say die attitude. We were no different. To prepare ourselves for combat, we studied the flying and weapon characteristics of the F-15s to discover any weakness that could be exploited - we found none. In every regime they outperformed us by a wide margin. But there was one slight advantage we enjoyed. Visual spotting of the F-15 for us was far easier than for the F-15 pilots to establish visual tally with us because as compared to the majestic F-15s, we were only half their size. Their brilliant AI radar with the Target Designator (TD) box feature that was unknown in our part of the world at that point in time however neutralised the drawback. The TD box pinpointed our position on their Heads Up Display (HUD) that aided them immensely in establishing visual contact with us. If only we could fool their AI radar, we stood a chance. Hmmm, time to come up with something unexpected. Think outside the box. That appeared to be our only salvation. The combined briefings laid down the rules of the game for the camp. All combats would take place in the designated areas from 10,000 Above Ground Level (AGL). The upper height limit was not specified. F-15s would hunt in pairs whereas we had the option of employing up to 4 aircraft though in majority of engagements we also operated in twos. F-15s were to be configured with training AIM-7 Sparrow BVR missiles, along with AIM-9s (heat seeking missiles) and cannons. We only had the heat seekers and cannons but no BVR missiles. The F-15 Airborne Intercept (AI) radar had a pick up range of over 40 NMS; our Mirage AI radar capability was zero and the poor F-6 did not even carry an AI radar. To even out certain obvious disadvantages of our fleet, it was agreed that we would operate under positive ground radar cover whereas the F-15s would rely on their AI radars. Also, while the F-15s could simulates Sparrow Launch (Fox 1) from long-ranges, staying well clear of the lethal ranges of our missiles and cannons, the engagement would continue till one side managed a heat missile (Fox 2) kill parameter or gunshot cine/video on one or both the adversaries. To resolve the dispute about who took the first shot, the F-15s with their multiple radios were to announce on our channel a kill (Fox 2/Fox 3) immediately on exposing valid gun camera film, after which the stricken aircraft was to remove itself from the combat arena. If we achieved a Fox 2/Fox 3 on the F-15s, without earlier announcement of being 'foxed' by the F-15s, the kill would be granted to us subject to its validity from gun camera film assessment. The show began on the third week of April. According to my log-book, I flew a total of seven missions against the F-15s, from 22nd April to 26 April. In retrospect I consider those five days as the most enjoyable and professionally rewarding week of my flying career. We achieved verifiable kill parameters on the F-15s and in the bargain gave away shots to them. Before revealing the final tally of the week-long camp, I would like to share with my young fighter pilots two episodes which will be of interest to them. To my non-fighter pilot readers I apologise in advance as the next group of paragraphs will be full for fighter pilots' jargons which only they can truly relish. You are at liberty to skip over these paragraphs if you feel so inclined. I was to lead a section of two Mirages against a pair of F-15s. Flt Lt Razzaq Anjum was my no 2 (Razzaq rose to the rank of AVM before he embraced martyrdom in the unfortunate Fokker 27 accident). From our earlier experience we knew that there was only one way we could prevail - do the unexpected. We had to somehow make the F-15 pair lose sight of one of us, who could then sneak in for a kill. Given the very impressive performance of the F-15 airborne radar, normal tactics was bound to fail. We had to try something very different. The standard practice for a pair entering the combat zone is to maintain battle formation that is line abreast and a mile to two miles apart, depending on the nature of threat. We chose to enter the battle arena in close formation, thereby hoping to present a single blip on the F-15 radar scope. We knew they would pick us up at around 40 NMS and seeing a single blip they would wonder about the other bogie. The superior performance of their weapon system just might lull them to a degree of complacency where they might not worry too much about the unaccounted bandit. When our ground radar reported bandits at 15 NMS, as per our game plan, we did a violent vertical split. I zoomed up while Razzak continued straight towards the target. Soon, Razzak called contact with one of the F-15s which apparently had not established visual tally with him. I saw him go after the F-15 and simultaneously spotted the second F-15 about 3-4 NMS behind Razzak maneuvering for a missile shot towards him. Apparently, neither of them had spotted me and I found myself favourably placed to go after the second F-15. Warning Razzak of the impending threat which was still a fair distance away from the lethal missile (Fox 2) range, I went after the second F-15. Before I could get in range for a missile shot, either on a warning by his comrade or his spotting me, the F-15 broke hard. In Mirage and F-6s, our break is normally in the turning plane but the F-15 pilot perhaps banking on the unbelievable thrust to weight ratio of his machine which permitted him to accelerate even while in a vertical climb, chose to break upward knowing that the Mirage would not be able to keep up with it for much longer. I followed him and soon both of us were facing vertical with my speed diminishing rapidly. Because of my initial speed and height advantage, I continued to close in for a valid missile shot and finally was within gun range and managed a decent gun shot before eventually falling off the sky. In the meanwhile Razzak too announced a Fox 2 and Fox 3 on his quarry. Since no Fox had been called on us till then, we had apparently drawn first blood. I eventually ran out of speed, control and ideas and fell off the sky, recovering without entering into a spin – no thanks to my superior handling – unlike the F-6, Mirage is far more docile and forgiving at low speeds. Pretty soon I saw the F-15 on my tail but he was gentleman enough to come over to our frequency and enquire if I had exposed cine on him. On my answering in the affirmative, the first engagement was called off. To be fair to the F-15 pair, in the next engagement (in each mission we could carry out up to two mix ups) we were unable to surprise them. They had us both firmly on their radars and rapidly closed in for close quarter one versus one engagement. Our only realistic option was to hightail it and make an immediate exit out of the designated combat zone well before establishment of visual tally by the F-15s. We did not. Despite our twists and turns, barrels, and even threatening to spin out, we were clobbered, but not without putting up a futile albeit a gallant resistance. For the mission the final score stood two for us and two for them – an even contest. After landing as I met Razzak on the tarmac, he wore a grin that would have made the Cheshire cat proud. "What?" I asked him. "You should see the gunshot I have exposed on the F-15", he burst out. "Let's check it out", I answered. We assessed our films. Both my claims were valid and so were Razzak's but there was a catch. The minimum safe distance specified in the Rules of Engagement (ROE) during gunshot was 600 feet. In Razzak's gunshot cine, the Mirage gun sight was the same size as the F-15 canopy – he had closed in to less than a 100 feet of the F-15 and still had the sight sitting pretty and steady. "Oh my God!" I exclaimed. "Hide it. If the bosses see it, both of us would get grounded, if not worse," "But don't you agree it is a beautiful sight," he countered. "I am impressed," I answered and just could not help marvel at the enthusiasm and ego of my irrepressible no 2. The mutual debrief was very educative. "How did you stay behind me in the vertical break," the F-15 leader wondered. "What was your speed when you initiated the break," I queried. "250 knots," he answered. "I was closed to 450 kts," I replied. "That explains it", he concluded. His no.2 had apparently lost sight of Razzak as he was busy updating his leader on his (leader's) rather precarious position. I showed him Razzak's gun camera shot. He was dumbfounded for a few seconds. We saw their gun camera films and in the second engagement they had us good and proper in their sights and they too had closed in to less than 600 feet. Two kills to each pair in the mission was mutually agreed. We complimented the F-15 pair on their professionalism and they too applauded our subterfuge and aggressive handling. The next episode involved two F-6s flown by Safdar and his No.2 against two F-15s flown by the F-15 Wing Commander, a full colonel and his No 2. I am not aware of how the mix up proceeded but would like to quote from memory the following narration of the event by the USAF Wing Commander: "On our AI radar we picked up only one target and soon spotted a lone F-6 heading south. Assuming that the other one was not in the arena, I promptly achieved Fox 2 parameter and closed in for a Fox 3 shot. On my stand-by radio I announce," F-6 flying south, Fox 2 and Fox 3 on you". Back came the chilling reply, "Which F-6 are you referring at. There are two of us heading south." Instinctively I swiveled my neck and looked back. Sure enough an F-6 well within the missile range was sitting merrily at my six. It turned out to be the F-6 leader and I could almost imagine him grinning under his helmet, under his bushy moustache." What tactics had Safdar's formation employed to escape radar detection? Why did he not warn his No.2 to break? Perhaps he might have concluded that the No. 2 was a dead duck regardless and why not even the score and bag an F-15 in the bargain. Where was the second F-15? I am not aware of the details and we need to get hold of Safdar and ask him to render his version of the event in his own inimitable style, a style that I can assure you would be both interesting and very hilarious. The camp was a roaring success. I do not have the official result but if I recall the final kill ratio was roughly 2:1 in favour of the F-15s. In all their other engagements against the likes of Saab Drakens, F-4s, Mirages, Lightnings and F-104s flown by European pilots in Continental Europe, the Wing had apparently enjoyed as high as 20:1 kill ratio in their favour. Our pilots' aggressive manoeuvring and tactical skills came as a surprise to them. We too were impressed by the awesome flying performance of the F-15s, its unmatched (at that time) AI radar performance and the thorough professionalism and sportsmanship of the USAF pilots. Exercise Midlink 78 was held in November/December 1978 where air and maritime forces of Pakistan and USA interacted with each other off the Karachi coast and in the air spaces around Karachi and the Arabian Sea. As the Flight Commander of No.5 Squadron, I was again fortunate and privileged to have taken part in the Exercise. The air portion of Exercise Midlink 78 was fairly conventional. Red forces (aggressors) were represented by land based USAF F-111 and F-4 squadrons operating from Masroor. PAF Mirage IIIs and F-6s again from Masroor operated in the air defence role. F-111s (singly) and F-4s (in pairs) conducted raids over Masroor while Mirages and F-6s from Masroor carried out interceptions with the aid of air defence radar that were deployed for the purpose. The aggressors ingressed at low levels and while the minimum height from safety point of view was 250 feet Above Ground Level (AGL), the F-111s, having their terrain following radars at their disposal invariably flew in at about 100 feet AGL. We as the defenders rarely complained. As per the Rules of Engagements, the interceptor was permitted to carry out a single attack simulating a heat missile (Fox 2) or gun shot (Fox 3) while the attackers were permitted one hard turn into the interceptor at which point further manoeuvring by both was to cease. These restrictions were placed for flight safety reasons. These restrictions, as we soon learnt, existed on paper only. F-111s, basically being an attack aircraft with little pretence to air combat potential, generally adhered to the laid down rules. The F-4s were a different kettle of fish. They had too much of fighter ego ingrained in their psyche to tamely allow another fighter jock to expose gun camera film on them capturing their theoretical destruction without a serious struggle. On a number of occasions, a hard turn by the strike formation led to full fledged combat at what in our fighter pilots' lexicon is termed as the 'deck level'. These manoeuvrings and subsequent claims were never officially revealed as it would have resulted in strict disciplinary actions on both the guilty parties. But unofficially we talked about it in a hushed manner, displaying the cines on the quiet and only to each other. Till the advent of F-15s and then F-16s, F-4s were the most potent fighter/ground attack aircraft in USAF's inventory. During the Arab – Israeli war of 1973 when the Israeli Air Force possessed both F-4s and Mirages, the former was considered to be their No.1 air combat aircraft. With that impressive background, we expected a very tough dog-fight if the F-4s decided to engage us seriously in air combat. The F-4s, as I had mentioned earlier, on more than one occasion took us on and much to our surprise and delight we normally enjoyed the upper hand in those engagement. Mercifully also, there were no mishaps. Was Mirage a better air superiority fighter than the F-4 or were we better trained in air combat than the F-4 crews we had engaged? Even the F-4 crews were surprised at our dexterity. Informal discussion with the F-4 squadron pilots revealed that the particular squadron we were dealing with had reconnaissance and strike as their primarily roles. Air combat manoeuvres were restricted primarily to defensive manoeuvring. No wonder, we had outperformed that lot of F-4 pilots in the air combat role. Now a word of advice and caution from an old sinner to my younger colleagues. Exercise Midlink was one of the very few occasions when I had deliberately violated the rules and was fortunate to get away with it. In my 28 years of active service with the PAF where I flew practically all the fighters in the PAF inventory for about twenty years, I was not involved in a single accident, major or minor. Either I was fortunate or I really was not a habitual rule breaker. The fact that I was and will always remain a fighter pilot at heart and that we were engaging the world's premier air force pilots in combat led me to believe, wrongly I realise now, that PAF's honour had to be protected at any cost. Perhaps we were fortunate or perhaps we had the necessary skill to engage in low level combat without flying into the ground. A bit of both I think and the fact that I had just completed the Combat Commanders' Course where we had trained for low level combat. My fervent appeal therefore to my young friends is not to indulge in any activity for which you have not been specifically trained, or which is strictly forbidden.
^ PAKISTAN AND THE WORLD (Chronology April — June 1987). (1987). Pakistan Horizon, 40(2), 110–131. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41394250
^ "Afghans Shot Down Intruding Pakistani F-16 That Ignored Warnings, Kabul Says". www.latimes.com. 2 May 1987. In a period of increasing tension on the mountainous border between the two countries, it was the first time that Pakistan had lost an aircraft to Afghan warplanes. Pakistani fighters have shot down two Afghan aircraft that, according to the Pakistani government, had violated Pakistani airspace. The most recent incident, in which Pakistani F-16s downed an Afghan AN-26 on March 30 in the same border area near Miram Shah, has become a bitter issue here in Afghanistan. Thousands of wall posters around the Afghan capital and in neighboring villages depict the jet fighters splitting open the Afghan aircraft and spilling women and children to the ground. Officials in the Soviet-backed Afghan regime contended that the plane was a civilian transport carrying 40 passengers, including two children, bound for Khost, 15 miles inside Afghanistan.
^ "F-16.net - The ultimate F-16, F-35 and F-22 reference". www.f-16.net.
^ "The World: Afghan Plane Shot Down". www.latimes.com. 17 April 1987.
^ Yusufzai, Rahimullah (22 February 2003). "Doomed plane might have hit mountain peak". GulfNews. Retrieved 19 January 2018.
^ ^a ^b "Funeral held for Pakistan air chief". BBC Pakistan Bureau. BBC. 21 February 2003. Retrieved 19 January 2018.
^ Goraya, Abdul-Majid (21 February 2003). "PAF chief killed in air crash: Two AVMs, Mushaf's wife among 17 dead •Inquiry begins". www.dawn.com. Kohat Pass. Retrieved 19 January 2018.
^ "Obituary: Dedicated to the Glorious PAF Shaheeds". Defence Journal. March 2003. Archived from the original on 2008-10-14. Retrieved 2024-01-22.
^ "Air chief's death condoled". www.dawn.com. 22 February 2003. Retrieved 19 January 2018.
^ "3 PAF officers buried in Pindi". 22 February 2003.
^ ^a ^b Rahman, Javaid (6 October 2015). "'Faulty plane behind air chief's crash-death'". The Nation. The Nation. The Nation. Retrieved 19 January 2018. The committee head Rana Afzaal, giving three months time to present report to the committee, said "due to a faulty aircraft we lost Air chief."
^ "Air chief vows to continue Mushaf's mission". brecorder. 21 February 2004.

[award-1] This record remained unbroken for 27 years

[dj-2] "An Airman Remembered". Defence Journal. 1 March 2003. Archived from the original on 28 August 2016. Retrieved 22 January 2024.

[SPAF-3] Rashid Shaikh, A. (2000). The Story of the Pakistan Air Force, 1988-1998. Shaheen Foundation. pp. 372, 373. ISBN 978-969-8553-00-5.

[4] "Pakistan's Successful Encounters During the Afghan War". Global Defense Insight. 13 December 2021.

[dawn-5] "The cadet college issue". www.dawn.com. 17 May 2005. Mianwali district, the abode of valiant and talented people, remained deprived of such quality educational institutions. In fact, the entire southern and central Punjab did not have any institution like a cadet college, except PAF College, Sargodha. Perhaps it was because of this sense of deprivation that notable sons of the soil like AVM Shaheed Abdul Razzaq and MNA Imran Khan had been trying for the establishment of a cadet college in Mianwali. Their dreams seemed to be coming true when Governor Khalid Maqbool announced the establishment of a cadet college in Mianwali while speaking at a public gathering on Jan 24, 2002. The announcement was followed by directives for the preparation of a feasibility report of this project.

[6] "Fazaia | Schools & Colleges". fazaia.edu.pk.

[pfazaia-7] Abdul Razzaq Fazaia College - ARFiC NEWS

[8] "In connection with Air Force Day". Daily Soon Times. 2022.

[dawnpk-9] "AVM Razzaq laid to rest". www.dawn.com. 22 February 2003.

[tribunepk-10] Hussain, Jamal (2005). "A page in PAF history". tribune.com.pk. Early this year, USAF had conducted a joint air exercise with the Indian Air Force, codenamed 'Cope India'. A brief report of the event appeared in the Dawn article of Friday June 15 titled, "Air exercise with India a wake-up call for US: general". The article brought back fond memories of similar exercises that PAF used to hold with USAF on a regular basis in the sixty and seventy decades of the previous century. I was fortunate to attend two very comprehensive joint USAF/PAF exercises in April and November/December 1978 codenamed Shabaz78 and Midlink 78 respectively. I consider it a privilege to be able to share my experiences of the two events with the public in general and my successors, the current generation of PAF fighter pilots. If you want a peep into the dream and wonderful world of fighter pilots where passion, vocation and profession are rolled into a single homogenous mix, then read on. Welcome to our little world with our idiosyncrasies and jargons that only we relish and are familiar with. Shahbaz 78, a joint USAF/PAF Exercise was held at PAF Base Masroor in April 1978. A detachment of Mirage Squadron from Sargodha Base was deployed at Masroor for the purpose. The first part of the exercise was fairly straight forward where USAF aircraft conducted night raids at Masroor Base and PAF interceptors flew air defence missions against them. Both the USAF strike elements and PAF's air defence fighters operated from Masroor. The second half of the exercise was a planned Dissimilar Air Combat Training Camp (DACT) that pitted the formidable F-15s, USAF's prize new acquisition against PAF's Mirages and F6s. For much of the 60s and part of the 70s of the twentieth century, USAF F-4s were considered the top of the line combat aircraft, especially in the air superiority role. Following their not so encouraging performance in air combat in the Vietnam War (kill ratio of 4:1 in favour of USAF as against 10:1 in the Korean Conflict), USAF was looking for an unadulterated air superiority fighter to replace the multi-role and aging F-4 fleet. The F-15 entered service around 1975 and in every parameter of combat manoeuvring, it outperformed its contemporaries by a wide margin. It was developed for one single role – establish air superiority by decimating the adversary's combat aircraft in air combat. The F-15 combat Wings that were raised were not assigned multi-roles; they concentrated solely on air to air combat training and nothing else. One such Wing was deployed at Bittburg in Germany. Besides conducting mutual air combat missions, they frequently flew against Saab-Drakens, Lightnings, Phantoms, Mirages and F-104s belonging to the air forces of their European NATO allies. The stories of how they have been chewing up their adversaries with consummate ease had preceded their arrival. The Wing was deployed at PAF Base Masroor in April 78 to participate in a DACT Camp. I had the privilege of being a member of the Mirage flight deployed at Masroor for the purpose. The F-6 Squadron that participated in the Exercise was commanded by the irrepressible Wing Commander Safdar Mahmood (retired as Air Commodore), better known to his comrades as Safdar Mousey, for reasons I never knew then and still do not know till today. The gleaming F-15s parked at Masroor tarmac were a sight to behold. Here was the most lethal fighter of its time and we by comparison in our antiquated Mirages and F-6s were going to take them head on, both in the literal and metaphorical sense. How should we plan to achieve this apparently improbable feat? Vanity is an essential ingredient of fighter pilots and they are generally hopeless optimists with a never say die attitude. We were no different. To prepare ourselves for combat, we studied the flying and weapon characteristics of the F-15s to discover any weakness that could be exploited - we found none. In every regime they outperformed us by a wide margin. But there was one slight advantage we enjoyed. Visual spotting of the F-15 for us was far easier than for the F-15 pilots to establish visual tally with us because as compared to the majestic F-15s, we were only half their size. Their brilliant AI radar with the Target Designator (TD) box feature that was unknown in our part of the world at that point in time however neutralised the drawback. The TD box pinpointed our position on their Heads Up Display (HUD) that aided them immensely in establishing visual contact with us. If only we could fool their AI radar, we stood a chance. Hmmm, time to come up with something unexpected. Think outside the box. That appeared to be our only salvation. The combined briefings laid down the rules of the game for the camp. All combats would take place in the designated areas from 10,000 Above Ground Level (AGL). The upper height limit was not specified. F-15s would hunt in pairs whereas we had the option of employing up to 4 aircraft though in majority of engagements we also operated in twos. F-15s were to be configured with training AIM-7 Sparrow BVR missiles, along with AIM-9s (heat seeking missiles) and cannons. We only had the heat seekers and cannons but no BVR missiles. The F-15 Airborne Intercept (AI) radar had a pick up range of over 40 NMS; our Mirage AI radar capability was zero and the poor F-6 did not even carry an AI radar. To even out certain obvious disadvantages of our fleet, it was agreed that we would operate under positive ground radar cover whereas the F-15s would rely on their AI radars. Also, while the F-15s could simulates Sparrow Launch (Fox 1) from long-ranges, staying well clear of the lethal ranges of our missiles and cannons, the engagement would continue till one side managed a heat missile (Fox 2) kill parameter or gunshot cine/video on one or both the adversaries. To resolve the dispute about who took the first shot, the F-15s with their multiple radios were to announce on our channel a kill (Fox 2/Fox 3) immediately on exposing valid gun camera film, after which the stricken aircraft was to remove itself from the combat arena. If we achieved a Fox 2/Fox 3 on the F-15s, without earlier announcement of being 'foxed' by the F-15s, the kill would be granted to us subject to its validity from gun camera film assessment. The show began on the third week of April. According to my log-book, I flew a total of seven missions against the F-15s, from 22nd April to 26 April. In retrospect I consider those five days as the most enjoyable and professionally rewarding week of my flying career. We achieved verifiable kill parameters on the F-15s and in the bargain gave away shots to them. Before revealing the final tally of the week-long camp, I would like to share with my young fighter pilots two episodes which will be of interest to them. To my non-fighter pilot readers I apologise in advance as the next group of paragraphs will be full for fighter pilots' jargons which only they can truly relish. You are at liberty to skip over these paragraphs if you feel so inclined. I was to lead a section of two Mirages against a pair of F-15s. Flt Lt Razzaq Anjum was my no 2 (Razzaq rose to the rank of AVM before he embraced martyrdom in the unfortunate Fokker 27 accident). From our earlier experience we knew that there was only one way we could prevail - do the unexpected. We had to somehow make the F-15 pair lose sight of one of us, who could then sneak in for a kill. Given the very impressive performance of the F-15 airborne radar, normal tactics was bound to fail. We had to try something very different. The standard practice for a pair entering the combat zone is to maintain battle formation that is line abreast and a mile to two miles apart, depending on the nature of threat. We chose to enter the battle arena in close formation, thereby hoping to present a single blip on the F-15 radar scope. We knew they would pick us up at around 40 NMS and seeing a single blip they would wonder about the other bogie. The superior performance of their weapon system just might lull them to a degree of complacency where they might not worry too much about the unaccounted bandit. When our ground radar reported bandits at 15 NMS, as per our game plan, we did a violent vertical split. I zoomed up while Razzak continued straight towards the target. Soon, Razzak called contact with one of the F-15s which apparently had not established visual tally with him. I saw him go after the F-15 and simultaneously spotted the second F-15 about 3-4 NMS behind Razzak maneuvering for a missile shot towards him. Apparently, neither of them had spotted me and I found myself favourably placed to go after the second F-15. Warning Razzak of the impending threat which was still a fair distance away from the lethal missile (Fox 2) range, I went after the second F-15. Before I could get in range for a missile shot, either on a warning by his comrade or his spotting me, the F-15 broke hard. In Mirage and F-6s, our break is normally in the turning plane but the F-15 pilot perhaps banking on the unbelievable thrust to weight ratio of his machine which permitted him to accelerate even while in a vertical climb, chose to break upward knowing that the Mirage would not be able to keep up with it for much longer. I followed him and soon both of us were facing vertical with my speed diminishing rapidly. Because of my initial speed and height advantage, I continued to close in for a valid missile shot and finally was within gun range and managed a decent gun shot before eventually falling off the sky. In the meanwhile Razzak too announced a Fox 2 and Fox 3 on his quarry. Since no Fox had been called on us till then, we had apparently drawn first blood. I eventually ran out of speed, control and ideas and fell off the sky, recovering without entering into a spin – no thanks to my superior handling – unlike the F-6, Mirage is far more docile and forgiving at low speeds. Pretty soon I saw the F-15 on my tail but he was gentleman enough to come over to our frequency and enquire if I had exposed cine on him. On my answering in the affirmative, the first engagement was called off. To be fair to the F-15 pair, in the next engagement (in each mission we could carry out up to two mix ups) we were unable to surprise them. They had us both firmly on their radars and rapidly closed in for close quarter one versus one engagement. Our only realistic option was to hightail it and make an immediate exit out of the designated combat zone well before establishment of visual tally by the F-15s. We did not. Despite our twists and turns, barrels, and even threatening to spin out, we were clobbered, but not without putting up a futile albeit a gallant resistance. For the mission the final score stood two for us and two for them – an even contest. After landing as I met Razzak on the tarmac, he wore a grin that would have made the Cheshire cat proud. "What?" I asked him. "You should see the gunshot I have exposed on the F-15", he burst out. "Let's check it out", I answered. We assessed our films. Both my claims were valid and so were Razzak's but there was a catch. The minimum safe distance specified in the Rules of Engagement (ROE) during gunshot was 600 feet. In Razzak's gunshot cine, the Mirage gun sight was the same size as the F-15 canopy – he had closed in to less than a 100 feet of the F-15 and still had the sight sitting pretty and steady. "Oh my God!" I exclaimed. "Hide it. If the bosses see it, both of us would get grounded, if not worse," "But don't you agree it is a beautiful sight," he countered. "I am impressed," I answered and just could not help marvel at the enthusiasm and ego of my irrepressible no 2. The mutual debrief was very educative. "How did you stay behind me in the vertical break," the F-15 leader wondered. "What was your speed when you initiated the break," I queried. "250 knots," he answered. "I was closed to 450 kts," I replied. "That explains it", he concluded. His no.2 had apparently lost sight of Razzak as he was busy updating his leader on his (leader's) rather precarious position. I showed him Razzak's gun camera shot. He was dumbfounded for a few seconds. We saw their gun camera films and in the second engagement they had us good and proper in their sights and they too had closed in to less than 600 feet. Two kills to each pair in the mission was mutually agreed. We complimented the F-15 pair on their professionalism and they too applauded our subterfuge and aggressive handling. The next episode involved two F-6s flown by Safdar and his No.2 against two F-15s flown by the F-15 Wing Commander, a full colonel and his No 2. I am not aware of how the mix up proceeded but would like to quote from memory the following narration of the event by the USAF Wing Commander: "On our AI radar we picked up only one target and soon spotted a lone F-6 heading south. Assuming that the other one was not in the arena, I promptly achieved Fox 2 parameter and closed in for a Fox 3 shot. On my stand-by radio I announce," F-6 flying south, Fox 2 and Fox 3 on you". Back came the chilling reply, "Which F-6 are you referring at. There are two of us heading south." Instinctively I swiveled my neck and looked back. Sure enough an F-6 well within the missile range was sitting merrily at my six. It turned out to be the F-6 leader and I could almost imagine him grinning under his helmet, under his bushy moustache." What tactics had Safdar's formation employed to escape radar detection? Why did he not warn his No.2 to break? Perhaps he might have concluded that the No. 2 was a dead duck regardless and why not even the score and bag an F-15 in the bargain. Where was the second F-15? I am not aware of the details and we need to get hold of Safdar and ask him to render his version of the event in his own inimitable style, a style that I can assure you would be both interesting and very hilarious. The camp was a roaring success. I do not have the official result but if I recall the final kill ratio was roughly 2:1 in favour of the F-15s. In all their other engagements against the likes of Saab Drakens, F-4s, Mirages, Lightnings and F-104s flown by European pilots in Continental Europe, the Wing had apparently enjoyed as high as 20:1 kill ratio in their favour. Our pilots' aggressive manoeuvring and tactical skills came as a surprise to them. We too were impressed by the awesome flying performance of the F-15s, its unmatched (at that time) AI radar performance and the thorough professionalism and sportsmanship of the USAF pilots. Exercise Midlink 78 was held in November/December 1978 where air and maritime forces of Pakistan and USA interacted with each other off the Karachi coast and in the air spaces around Karachi and the Arabian Sea. As the Flight Commander of No.5 Squadron, I was again fortunate and privileged to have taken part in the Exercise. The air portion of Exercise Midlink 78 was fairly conventional. Red forces (aggressors) were represented by land based USAF F-111 and F-4 squadrons operating from Masroor. PAF Mirage IIIs and F-6s again from Masroor operated in the air defence role. F-111s (singly) and F-4s (in pairs) conducted raids over Masroor while Mirages and F-6s from Masroor carried out interceptions with the aid of air defence radar that were deployed for the purpose. The aggressors ingressed at low levels and while the minimum height from safety point of view was 250 feet Above Ground Level (AGL), the F-111s, having their terrain following radars at their disposal invariably flew in at about 100 feet AGL. We as the defenders rarely complained. As per the Rules of Engagements, the interceptor was permitted to carry out a single attack simulating a heat missile (Fox 2) or gun shot (Fox 3) while the attackers were permitted one hard turn into the interceptor at which point further manoeuvring by both was to cease. These restrictions were placed for flight safety reasons. These restrictions, as we soon learnt, existed on paper only. F-111s, basically being an attack aircraft with little pretence to air combat potential, generally adhered to the laid down rules. The F-4s were a different kettle of fish. They had too much of fighter ego ingrained in their psyche to tamely allow another fighter jock to expose gun camera film on them capturing their theoretical destruction without a serious struggle. On a number of occasions, a hard turn by the strike formation led to full fledged combat at what in our fighter pilots' lexicon is termed as the 'deck level'. These manoeuvrings and subsequent claims were never officially revealed as it would have resulted in strict disciplinary actions on both the guilty parties. But unofficially we talked about it in a hushed manner, displaying the cines on the quiet and only to each other. Till the advent of F-15s and then F-16s, F-4s were the most potent fighter/ground attack aircraft in USAF's inventory. During the Arab – Israeli war of 1973 when the Israeli Air Force possessed both F-4s and Mirages, the former was considered to be their No.1 air combat aircraft. With that impressive background, we expected a very tough dog-fight if the F-4s decided to engage us seriously in air combat. The F-4s, as I had mentioned earlier, on more than one occasion took us on and much to our surprise and delight we normally enjoyed the upper hand in those engagement. Mercifully also, there were no mishaps. Was Mirage a better air superiority fighter than the F-4 or were we better trained in air combat than the F-4 crews we had engaged? Even the F-4 crews were surprised at our dexterity. Informal discussion with the F-4 squadron pilots revealed that the particular squadron we were dealing with had reconnaissance and strike as their primarily roles. Air combat manoeuvres were restricted primarily to defensive manoeuvring. No wonder, we had outperformed that lot of F-4 pilots in the air combat role. Now a word of advice and caution from an old sinner to my younger colleagues. Exercise Midlink was one of the very few occasions when I had deliberately violated the rules and was fortunate to get away with it. In my 28 years of active service with the PAF where I flew practically all the fighters in the PAF inventory for about twenty years, I was not involved in a single accident, major or minor. Either I was fortunate or I really was not a habitual rule breaker. The fact that I was and will always remain a fighter pilot at heart and that we were engaging the world's premier air force pilots in combat led me to believe, wrongly I realise now, that PAF's honour had to be protected at any cost. Perhaps we were fortunate or perhaps we had the necessary skill to engage in low level combat without flying into the ground. A bit of both I think and the fact that I had just completed the Combat Commanders' Course where we had trained for low level combat. My fervent appeal therefore to my young friends is not to indulge in any activity for which you have not been specifically trained, or which is strictly forbidden.

[11] PAKISTAN AND THE WORLD (Chronology April — June 1987). (1987). Pakistan Horizon, 40(2), 110–131. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41394250

[12] "Afghans Shot Down Intruding Pakistani F-16 That Ignored Warnings, Kabul Says". www.latimes.com. 2 May 1987. In a period of increasing tension on the mountainous border between the two countries, it was the first time that Pakistan had lost an aircraft to Afghan warplanes. Pakistani fighters have shot down two Afghan aircraft that, according to the Pakistani government, had violated Pakistani airspace. The most recent incident, in which Pakistani F-16s downed an Afghan AN-26 on March 30 in the same border area near Miram Shah, has become a bitter issue here in Afghanistan. Thousands of wall posters around the Afghan capital and in neighboring villages depict the jet fighters splitting open the Afghan aircraft and spilling women and children to the ground. Officials in the Soviet-backed Afghan regime contended that the plane was a civilian transport carrying 40 passengers, including two children, bound for Khost, 15 miles inside Afghanistan.

[13] "F-16.net - The ultimate F-16, F-35 and F-22 reference". www.f-16.net.

[lata-14] "The World: Afghan Plane Shot Down". www.latimes.com. 17 April 1987.

[GulfNews,_2003-15] Yusufzai, Rahimullah (22 February 2003). "Doomed plane might have hit mountain peak". GulfNews. Retrieved 19 January 2018.

[BBC_Pakistan_Bureau-16] "Funeral held for Pakistan air chief". BBC Pakistan Bureau. BBC. 21 February 2003. Retrieved 19 January 2018.

[Dawn_Newspaper,_AM_Goraya-17] Goraya, Abdul-Majid (21 February 2003). "PAF chief killed in air crash: Two AVMs, Mushaf's wife among 17 dead •Inquiry begins". www.dawn.com. Kohat Pass. Retrieved 19 January 2018.

[18] "Obituary: Dedicated to the Glorious PAF Shaheeds". Defence Journal. March 2003. Archived from the original on 2008-10-14. Retrieved 2024-01-22.

[Dawn_Newspaper,_2003-19] "Air chief's death condoled". www.dawn.com. 22 February 2003. Retrieved 19 January 2018.

[dawntv-20] "3 PAF officers buried in Pindi". 22 February 2003.

[The_Nation,_Rahman_2015_report-21] Rahman, Javaid (6 October 2015). "'Faulty plane behind air chief's crash-death'". The Nation. The Nation. The Nation. Retrieved 19 January 2018. The committee head Rana Afzaal, giving three months time to present report to the committee, said "due to a faulty aircraft we lost Air chief."

[22] "Air chief vows to continue Mushaf's mission". brecorder. 21 February 2004.

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